We assess how the African slave trade-which had enduring effects on social cohesioncontinues to influence financial systems. After showing that the intensity with which people were enslaved and exported from Africa during the 1400 -1900 period helps account for overall financial development, household access to credit, and firm access to finance, we evaluate three potential mechanisms linking the slave trade to modern finance-information sharing institutions, trust in financial institutions, and the quality of legal institutions. We discover that the slave trade is strongly, negatively related to the information sharing and trust mechanisms but not to the legal mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Given the importance of finance for economic growth, an active body of research examines the historical determinants of financial development.
1 Many researchers focus on European colonization. La Porta, et al. (1997 Porta, et al. ( , 1998 Porta, et al. ( , 2008 show that as European countries colonized much of the world, they spread distinct legal systems that continue to influence investor protection laws and financial development. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) stress that European colonizers created different, persistent political institutions that have had enduring effects on financial development (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003) . Beyond colonization, other work stresses that social trust ameliorates two frictions that often impede financial transactions-unfamiliar counterparties and intertemporal exchange, and shows that historically determined differences in social trust shape modern financial development (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, Karlan, 2005) . Researchers, however, have not yet explored the mechanisms through which the slave trade influences modern finance. Evidence on the mechanisms will help distinguish among different views of how social cohesion influences finance and contribute additional evidence on whether the slave trade exerts a causal effect on financial development.
In this paper, we empirically evaluate three mechanisms through which the historical African slave trade might shape modern finance. First, as emphasized by Lovejoy (2000) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) , enslavement often occurred through inter-African village wars and raids that created a culture of distrust that persists till today. Distrust, in turn, can harm the operation of financial markets by impeding both transactions among unfamiliar counterparties and intertemporal exchange. To assess this mechanism, we examine whether the intensity with which people were enslaved and extracted from African regions is negatively associated with trust in financial institutions today. Second, the breakdown in social cohesion generated by the slave trades tended to limit economic and social interactions to members of small clans and therefore impeded both the formation of economies of efficient sizes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Kusimba 2004 ) and the development of institutions that facilitate transactions between diffuse non-clan members. For example, efficient economies develop institutions for sharing credit information about potential borrowers, and the resultant reduction in information asymmetries tends to improve the functioning of financial systems, as shown by Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) . Thus, we explore the connections between slave exports during the 1400 -1900 period and current measures of the quality of modern institutions for sharing credit information. Third, by fragmenting societies into small clans, the slave trade helped solidify and perpetuate narrow ethnic identities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Nunn 2008) . Easterly and Levine (1997) emphasize that ethnic fragmentation can stymie the development of institutions associated with property rights protection and contract enforcement, which are essential for financial development. To evaluate this third mechanism, we examine the association between the slave trade and indicators of the quality of the legal system. Thus, the purpose of our paper is to assess different views of how the historical slave trade-a major shock to social cohesion-continues to influence modern financial systems.
Besides evaluating these mechanisms, we also contribute to research on the historical determinants of financial development by examining household finance and overall financial development. Pierce and Snyder (2017a) examine the relationship between the slave trade and firm access to credit, which Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , and others stress is of first-order importance for economic growth. Financial systems, however, also provide welfare-promoting credit to households (Campbell 2006) . For example, in many countries, credit allows households to cushion shocks to family income, which reduces disruptions in the education of their children (e.g., Jacoby 1994 and Jacoby and Skoufias 1997), and when financial systems allow households to purchase homes, the accumulated home equity provides collateral for new business ventures. Thus, we test the links between the historical slave trade and household finance. Furthermore, since much of the work on finance and economic development has been conducted at the country level, we also assess the impact of the historical slave trade on overall financial development today.
To conduct our study, we assemble data on slave exports from 49 African countries and other potential determinants of financial development. Nunn (2008) provides data on the intensity with which people were enslaved and exported from each country. In particular, Slave exports equals the natural logarithm of the total number of slaves taken from each country during the period from 1400 through 1900 divided by the size of the country in millions of square kilometers. We also control for other historical characteristics of financial development that have been identified by past research. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) find that a country's legal origin, as defined by its European colonizer, explains current investor protection laws, contract enforcement efficiency, and hence financial development in general. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) show that a country's natural resource endowments influenced the political institutions instilled by European colonizers, which have had enduring effects on modern financial systems. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine the impact of cultural differences, including religion, on finance. We therefore control for legal origin, natural resource endowments, and other cultural and national traits in assessing the relation between the slave trade and the operation of modern financial systems.
Our analyses are divided into two parts: assessing the relation between the historical slave trade and modern financial development and dissecting the mechanisms linking the slave trade and the operation of financial systems. We begin by evaluating the relationship between the historical slave trade and three measures of modern financial development-overall financial development, household access to finance, and firm access to credit. To measure overall financial development, we use standard country-level measures of overall bank development that have been used to assess the impact of finance on growth, such as bank credit to the private sector as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Second, we use household survey data to construct measures of household access to credit, such as whether the household has ever received a loan or obtained a credit card. Third, we use firm-level data to construct measures of firm access to credit that are similar to those used in Pierce and Snyder (2017a) . We add to this line of research by exploring whether the negative relationship between firm financing constraints today and the intensity of slave exports during the 1400 -1900 period varies across industries in a theoretically consistent manner. Specifically, if slave exports influenced social cohesion in ways that continue to impede the efficient financing of firms, then the association between slave exports and obtaining external finance should be especially pronounced in firms that depend, for technological reasons, on external finance. We test this prediction using the approach in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Raddatz (2006) .
We find that the intensity of slave exports during the 1400 -1900 period is strongly, negatively associated with modern levels of overall financial development, household access to finance, and firm access to credit. The results hold when controlling for other historical determinants of financial development, the level and growth rate of GDP per capita, and many other country traits. When examining household or firm access to credit, the results are robust to controlling for household and firm characteristics respectively, such as the income, education, gender, and age of the person and the firm's size, growth, profitability, age, etc. For the firmlevel analyses, we find that the slave trade has a negative relationship with firm access to credit.
Moreover, the negative association between slave exports and accessing external finance is especially pronounced in firms that depend, for technological reasons, on external finance. We discover that the historical slave is strongly related to the information sharing and trust mechanisms but not to the legal mechanism. On the information mechanism, we find that the intensity of slave exports is negatively associated with the quality of information sharing about the creditworthiness of borrowers, and this finding is robust to controlling for the same factors discussed above. Moreover, we find that the slave trade is significantly and negatively associated with Private bureau coverage, but insignificantly associated with Public registry coverage. This is consistent with the views that (1) the historical slave trade impedes people's willingness to voluntarily share information with others, as private credit bureaus are not operated by the public sector and (2) the historical slave reduces information sharing, as Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) show that private bureaus are more effective at sharing credit information than public registries. The estimated effects are large. If we consider the conceptual experiment of a country moving from the 75 th percentile of the cross-country distribution of Slave exports to the 25 th percentile, the estimates indicate that the quality of information sharing would rise by more than 100% of the sample mean.
We also find strong support for the trust in financial institutions mechanism. We show that there is a large, positive, and statistically significant relation between slave exports during the 1400 -1900 period and mistrust in financial institutions today. The results hold across individuals with different education levels, suggesting that the slave trade left an enduring cultural scar that does not seem to be mitigated by education. The estimated coefficients suggest that the economic impact of slave exports on mistrust is large. Using the same conceptual experiment of moving from the 75 th to the 25 th percentile of the distribution of Slave exports, the estimates indicate that mistrust in financial institutions would fall by about 66% of the sample mean.
We do not, however, find support for the view that the slave trade influences financial development through the legal mechanisms. Specifically, we do not find a strong connection between the intensity of slave exports and the legal rights of creditors and shareholders, the efficiency of resolving insolvencies, or the effectiveness of contract enforcement today. This is consistent with the view that Europeans exported legal origins that continue to shape the financial contracting environment and that the historical slave trade did not exert an independent effect on financial development through this legal channel.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the results examining the relationship between slave exports and overall financial development, household access to credit, and firm access to credit.
Section 4 presents evidence on the mechanisms, and Section 5 concludes.
DATA
In this section, we define the key data that we use to evaluate the relationship between historical African slave trade and modern financial development and the potential mechanisms linking the slave trade to the functioning of current financial systems. Appendix Table A1 gives detailed variable definitions, and Table 1 provides summary statistics.
The Slave Trade Measure
We use the slave trade measures constructed by Nunn (2008) . Specifically, Slave exports equals the natural logarithm of the total number of slaves taken from each country during the period from 1400 through 1900, divided by the size of the country, as measured in millions of square kilometers. To estimate the total number of slaves taken from each country, Nunn (2008) first calculates the total number of slaves shipped from each coastal country in Africa. He then uses ethnic identity data on a sample of slaves exported from Africa to impute the proportion of slaves extracted from each country in Africa during the 1400 -1900 period. If no slaves were exported from a country, Nunn (2008) uses a value of 0.1 for the total number of slaves exported from a country, so that Slave exports is set to -2.3.
As shown in Table 1 , Slave exports ranges from -2.3 to 8.8, indicating that the total number of slaves taken from a country ranges from 0 to 6,756 relative to a country's land area.
We use data from 51 countries. Although there are 52 countries in the Nunn (2008) sample, we exclude Somalia due to a lack of financial development data. The median ratio of total slaves exported to land area is 102. There is considerable cross-country variation. Angola exported the largest number of slaves (more than 3.6 million from a single country), whereas 11 countries, such as Swaziland and Tunisia, exported virtually no slaves.
Financial Development Indicators
We use several financial development indicators and organize the presentation of these indicators by whether they are based on country-, household-, or firm-level data.
First, we use two cross-country indicators of overall financial development (Global Financial Development Database, 2016; Čihák et al., 2013 
Mechanism Indicators
We examine three potential mechanisms through which the historical African slave trade continues to influence financial systems across Africa: information sharing institutions, trust in financial institutions, and the legal system's effectiveness in supporting financial contracting. In this subsection, we describe the measures that we use for each mechanism.
First, we examine three cross-country measures of the quality of information sharing institutions from the World Bank's Doing Business Data. The data are compiled using the methodologies initially developed by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) with slight changes.
We analyze these measures because Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) show that information sharing about borrower creditworthiness facilitates the flow of bank credit to the private sector. That is, the quality of information sharing is a key factor shaping the operation of national financial systems. The three measures are as follows. 
Depth of credit information

Other Country Traits
Research shows that several historically determined national traits influence financial development and we control for these key traits in assessing the independent link between the African slave trade and the functioning of modern financial systems across Africa. First, French legal origin equals one if the origins of country's legal system are the French civil law and zero if the system has British common law origins, as all of the countries in our sample have either French or British legal origins. We use this measure based on the seminal findings in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) . They show that (1) former colonies that inherited British common law systems tend to have legal systems that better protect creditors and minority shareholders than former colonies with French legal origins and (2) these legal system differences materially shaped crosscountry differences in financial development. Thus, we use French legal origin as an exogenous source of variation in national legal systems that shape financial systems.
Second, as emphasized by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003), Levine (2005b) , and Easterly and Levine (2003 Levine ( , 2016 , Europeans adjusted their colonization strategies based on how familiar and hospitable they found conditions around the world. In places where Europeans found hospitable environments, they tended to settle and create institutions that protect private property rights, check against government power, and reduce contractual and informational impediments to competitive markets. In places with less hospitable conditions, Europeans were more likely to set up extractive states that had enduring, adverse repercussions on the country's institutional development in general and financial development in particular. To quantify cross-country differences in the degree to which Europeans found more or less familiar and hospitable conditions, we use (1) Latitude, which equals the logarithm of the absolute distance between each country and the equator and (2) Settler mortality, which equals the annualized death rates faced by European settlers in European colonies in the early 19th century and is obtained from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) .
We have data on Settler mortality for 37 out of 51 countries in our sample.
Third, several researchers stress that religion and the length of time a country has been independent can also influence financial development. (2001) In the household-level analyses, we control for a set of individual demographics, including an education indicator that equals one if an individual's educational attainment is secondary or more, indicators of income quintile, age and age squared, and a gender indicator.
Finally, in the firm-level analyses, we control for the following firm specific characteristics. Firm size equals the logarithm of the total number of employees; Firm age equals the logarithm of the number of years since a firm starts operation; Profitability equals the ratio of net profits to total sales; Government (Foreign) is an indicator that equals one if a firm has positive government (foreign) ownership, and zero otherwise; Exports is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a positive share of sales exported outside of the country, and zero otherwise; Sales growth is the median value of firms' sales growth within an industry in each year.
SLAVE EXPORTS AND MODERN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we evaluate the relationship between the African slave trade and modern finance across Africa. We examine three categories of financial development indicators: countrylevel measures of overall financial development, household-level indicators of household access to credit, and firm-level measures of the degree to which firms obtain credit.
To address the potential omitted variables concern, we first note that Nunn (2008) shows that the intensity with which people were enslaved and exported from different parts of Africa reflects the demand for slaves from around the world during the 1400 -1900 period. In particular, the travel distances between an African country and the largest demanders of slaves predict the exportation of people from across Africa to those slave markets. Exports do not reflect differences in the characteristics of the African regions beyond their distances to those slave-demanding markets, suggesting that potential omitted variables about the African country are unlikely to drive the results.
We begin by using cross-country, OLS regressions to evaluate the relationship between the number of slaves that were taken from a country (relative to the size of the country) during the 1400 -1900 period and measures of overall financial development. Specifically, we use the following regression specification: As shown in Table 2 , the extent to which slaves were exported from a country is strongly, negatively associated with financial development today when using either Private credit to GDP (2), and when further controlling for Settler mortality, which causes the sample size to drop materially, in column (3). Thus, the negative association between Slave exports and current financial development is not a simple manifestation of the impact of the slave trades on these other country characteristics.
Household Access to Finance
We next turn to the question: Is the intensity with which people were enslaved and exported from African during the 1400 -1900 period related to the degree to which household access credit today. We use the following regression specification:
where the dependent variable, _ , , is one of our two measures of the degree to which household i in country c has obtained credit from the formal financial system: Borrow from financial institutions or Credit card. Since the dependent variables are binary, we use a probit regression. We report heteroskedasticity consistent p-values, where the standard errors are clustered at the country level.
With respect to the explanatory variables, the country-level variablesand Xc-are the same as those used in the estimation of equation (1) amounts to more than 50% of the sample mean of Borrow from financial institutions. This suggests that the relationship between the intensity of slave exports during the half a millennium from 1400 until 1900 is powerfully related to the current degree to which households obtain loans from formal financial institutions.
Firm Access to Finance
For the firm-level analyses, we begin with the following regression equation: We report heteroskedasticity robust p-values, where the standard errors are clustered at the country level.
Consistent with Pierce and Snyder (2017a), we find that firms tend to receive much less financing from banks today in countries that had more Slave exports during the 1400 -1900
period. As shown in Panel A of Table 4 columns (1) - (2) and (5) (5) and (6). They suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Slave exports (3.9) diminishes the proportion of working capital financed from banks and the proportion of long-term investment financed from banks by about 0.059 (=0.015*3.9) and 0.086 (=0.022*3.9), respectively, which is equivalent to about 65% of the sample average of both Working capital financed from banks (0.086) and Investment financed from banks (0.131). One potential concern with interpreting these results is that it could be a demand side rather than a supply side effect. Perhaps, cross-country differences in the intensity of slave exports influence the nature of production in economies and hence the degree to which firms demand bank finance. This is a different interpretation from the one in which slave exports shape the functioning of financial systems and hence the supply of bank credit.
Pierce and Snyder (2017a), however, show that there is a strong, positive association between slave exports and firms reporting that they need finance but could not get it. This suggests that access to finance is more difficult in countries that experienced more slave exports.
4
Furthermore, we find that Slave exports are negatively associated with the degree to which a firm provides trade credit to (Trade receivable) and receives trade credit from (Trade payable) other firms. 5 Consistent with the earlier findings, the regressions in columns (3) - (4) 4 Also, see the discussion in Pierce and Snyder (2017b) and the work on the historical determinants of organizations by Kluppel, Pierce, and Snyder (2017). 5 As trade credit does not typically involve collateral or promissory notes subject to formal judicial enforcement mechanisms, it relies heavily on trust between business partners and access to credit information on other firms. To the extent that a more intensive experience with the slave trade had enduring repercussions on social trust and the development of information sharing institutions, slave exports during the 1400 -1900 period are expected to be negatively associated with trade credit today.
and (7) - (8) of Table 4 inventories not financed by current sales, Liquidity needs, which is also calculated at the threedigit ISIC level using U.S. data over the 1970s.
We use the following regression specification to assess the relationship between firm financing and the slave trade while differentiating by industry. As reported in Panel B of Table 4 , the relationships between Slave exports and the firm financing indicators vary across industries in a manner that is fully consistent with the two theoretical predictions articulated above. In particular, as shown in columns (1) - (2) and (5) (4) and (7) - (8) Thus, the relationship between the intensity of the slave trades in 1400 -1900 and the financing of firms today holds more strongly among firms in industries that rely heavily, for technological reasons, on funding from either financial institutions or other companies, which is consistent with the view that slave exports had enduring, harmful effects on the operation of financial systems. 
MECHANISMS LINKING SLAVE EXPORTS AND MODERN FINANCE
We now evaluate three mechanisms through which the historical African slave trade might continue to influence modern financial systems across Africa. We divide the section into three subsections corresponding to the three mechanisms: Information sharing institutions, trust in financial institutions, and legal institutions.
Information Sharing Institutions
We begin by examining the relationship between the intensity with which people were enslaved and exported from Africa and the quality of information sharing institutions today. As shown by Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) , the degree to which economies develop mechanisms for obtaining and sharing information on the creditworthiness of borrowers influences the efficient operation of financial systems. Moreover, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) discover that private credit bureaus are generally superior to public credit registries in effectively collecting and disseminating credit information. 6 The results are weaker in Trade payable regressions. This might result from the possibility that firms in high slavetrade countries obtain trade credit from foreign suppliers, thereby attenuating the coefficient estimates on the interaction term, Slave exports*Liquidity needs. 7 The estimated economic magnitudes are large. For example, consider the estimates from column (6) of We use cross-country, OLS regressions to evaluate the relationship between the quality of information sharing institutions and Slave exports:
where the dependent variable, , is one of three measures of the quality of information sharing institutions in a country: Depth of credit information, Private bureau coverage, and Public registry coverage. The other explanatory variables, Xc, are the same as those used above.
As shown in These findings are consistent with the view that one mechanism through which the slave trade continues to influence modern finance is its effects on the quality of information sharing institutions. As detailed in the Introduction, this view stresses that the slave trade created a climate of violence and fear that fragmented societies into isolated clans and limited the development of (1) institutions that facilitate transactions among diffuse non-clan members, and (2) institutions that share valuable information on the creditworthiness of borrowers and hence improve the efficient operation of financial systems. We discover that the slave trade is negatively associated with the quality of information sharing institutions, suggesting that this is one mechanism linking the slave trade and modern financial development across Africa.
Trust in Financial Institutions
We next examine the relationship between the slave trade and trust in financial institutions using the following regression equation.
where the dependent variable is Mistrust in financial institutions as reported by individual i in country c, the key explanatory variable is from country c, and the other regressors are the same as those used in the household-level regressions above. Our coefficient of interest is , which measures the relationship between slave exports and mistrust in financial institutions. We conduct the estimation using a Probit model with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Besides presenting the results with and without the macroeconomic controls, we also present the results when differentiating between more and less educated individuals to assess whether the relationship between mistrust in financial institutions today and slave exports in 1400 -1900 differs by the level of education.
As shown in Table 6 , there is a strong positive relationship between Slave exports and Mistrust in financial institutions. Consider first the full sample results. Slave exports enters positively and significantly whether excluding or including the macroeconomic controls (columns (1) and (2)). Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on Slave exports do not vary much across these two specifications, emphasizing the independent link between the slave trades and trust in financial institutions. The estimated coefficients from column (2) imply that the relationship is economically large. If a country were to move from the 75 th percentile of the cross-country distribution of Slave exports (6.66) to the 25 th percentile (-1.47), the average person in that country would tend to report a value of Mistrust in financial institutions that is 0.06 lower than his current response. This is large given that the average value of Mistrust in financial institutions is 0.09 with a standard deviation of 0.28. We next push these analyses a bit further by asking: Is the enduring impact of the historical slave trade on mistrust in financial institutions mitigated by education, or is the slave trade's influence on culture and social cohesion largely independent of the degree of education that an individual has received? To shed some empirical light on this question, we repeated these analyses for two subsamples of individuals: those who completed primary education or less and those that had at least some secondary education, which split the sample into two relatively equal sized groups. As shown, there is little difference in the estimated coefficient on Slave exports between these two subsamples, though the results become slightly weaker for the more educated group when also including the macroeconomic controls.
These findings suggest that one mechanism through which the slave trade continues to influence financial systems across Africa is trust in financial institutions. As summarized in the Introduction, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) demonstrate that the slave trade created an enduring culture of distrust and a large literature demonstrates that social trust exerts a positive impact on the operation of financial systems by facilitating transactions between unfamiliar counterparties and transactions that occur over time. In turn, we discover that the slave trade is negatively associated with trust in financial institutions.
Legal Institutions
We next examine the connection between the African slave trade and the degree to which the legal system supports financial contracting in the modern African economies. As discussed above, we use four legal system indicators: (1) Legal rights of creditors and debtors measures the extent to which laws protect the claims of debtors, which will tend to increase the supply of credit to firms and households; (2) Strength of insolvency framework index measures the extent to which the country's legal system supports the claims of creditors when borrowers default, which also facilitates the flow of external finance to firms and households; (3) Contract enforcement time measures how long it typically takes to get paid once a plaintiff files a lawsuit;
and (4) Contract enforcement costs measures the direct costs associated with filing, implementing, and resolving a lawsuit. Past research shows that both Contract enforcement time
and Contract enforcement costs are negatively related to the provision of external finance. We use the same cross-country regressions described above in our examination of the relationship between slave exports and the quality of information sharing institutions.
As reported in Table 7 , we do not find a strong connection between Slave exports and any of the measures of the degree to which the legal system supports financial contracting, with or without the macroeconomic controls. Neither Legal rights of creditors and debtors, Strength of insolvency framework index, Contract enforcement time, or Contract enforcement costs enters the Table 7 regressions significantly. These findings do not suggest that the legal system is unimportant for financial development. A large literature establishes the importance of the law for financial contracting. Rather, these findings indicate that the slave trade does not exert an independent effect on financial contracting environment after controlling for many other factors.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we contribute to research on two interrelated questions: What are the historical determinants of national differences in financial development and through which mechanisms do these historical factors influence the operation of modern financial systems? We focus on the historical African slave trade during the period from 1400 -1900, which Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011) show has had an enduring effect on social cohesion and culture across
Africa. More specifically, we examine the impact of the intensity with which people were captured, enslaved, and exported from Africa on financial development today and key institutions that shape modern financial systems. With respect to the first question, Pierce and Snyder (2017a) show that the slave trade is negatively associated with firm access to credit. We contribute by showing the intensity of the slave trade across African countries is also negatively associated with household access to credit and overall financial development. We further show that the negative association between slave exports and firm access to credit varies in a theoretically predictable manner, as the association is especially pronounced among firms that depend heavily on external finance for technological reasons.
With respect to the second question, we evaluate three potential mechanisms linking the historical slave trade to modern finance. A large body of evidence indicates that information sharing institutions that reduce information asymmetries about potential borrowers, the degree of trust that individuals have in financial institutions, and the quality of legal institutions influence the operation of modern financial systems. We discover that the intensity of the African slave trade in the 1400 -1900 period is strongly, negatively related to the quality of information sharing institutions and trust in financial institutions but is not strongly related to legal institutions. These findings are consistent with the view that two mechanisms through which the historical slave trade continues to influence modern financial systems across Africa are information sharing institutions and trust. Table A1 for more detailed variable definitions and data sources. P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Private credit to GDP Bank deposits to GDP Table 3 Slave exports and household access to finance, household-level analyses
This table reports Probit regression results of household access to finance on historical slave exports. We use the full sample in columns 1-2 and 4-5, and the subsample of high earning (top 40%) households in a country in columns 3 and 6. The dependent variable, Borrow from financial institutions, equals to one if a respondent borrowed any money from a bank or another formal financial institution, and zero otherwise. Credit card is an indicator that equals one if the respondent is reported to own a credit card that allows one to borrow money in order to make payments or buy things, and one can pay the balance off later. The key explanatory variable, Slave exports, is from Nunn (2008) and equals the natural logarithm of the total number of slaves exported from each country between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area. Individual controls include a gender indicator, age, age squared, three respondent education fixed effects (the omit group: education (completed tertiary or more)), and five household income level fixed effects (the omit group: Income (richest 20%)). French legal origin is an indicator that equals one if the commercial code of a country is French Commercial Code, and zero otherwise. Latitude equals the logarithm of the absolute distance between each country and the equator. Table A1 for more detailed variable definitions and data sources. P-values calculated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Borrow from financial institutions
Credit card
Overall sample Income top 40% Overall sample Income top 40% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Slave exports -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.073*** -0.025** -0.033*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001) Education (secondary or more) 0.311*** 0.292*** 0.306*** 0.538*** 0.458*** 0.511*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Income (second 20%) 0.088** 0.086* 0.152*** 0.149*** (0.050) (0.058) (0.002) (0.003) Income (middle 20%) 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.119* 0.125* (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.065) Income (fourth 20%) 0.234*** 0.235*** -0.216*** 0.359*** 0.372*** -0.269*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Income (richest 20%) 0.453*** 0.459*** 0.595*** 0.643*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Gender -0.051* -0.054** -0.066* -0.085** -0.095** -0.079* (0.058) (0.050) (0.061) (0.021) (0.020) (0.068) Age 7.454*** 7.498*** 9.752*** 4.338*** 4.478*** 5.019*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Age squared -0.988*** -0.997*** -1.302*** -0.549*** -0.578*** -0.644*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0. Table 4 Slave exports and firm access to finance, firm-level analyses
This table reports the regression results of the impact of historical slave exports on firm access to finance. Panel A presents the average effects, while Panel B shows the heterogeneous effects that differentiate industries by their dependence on external finance. The dependent variable is the amount of bank credit as a proportion of total working capital (Working capital financed from banks), the amount of bank credit for investment as a proportion of total investment (Investment financed from banks), the proportion of the value of total purchases of material inputs or services that are paid for after delivery (Trade payable), and the proportion of the value of total sales of goods or services that are paid for after delivery (Trade receivable). The key explanatory variable, Slave exports, is from Nunn (2008) and equals the natural logarithm of the total number of slaves exported from each country between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area. External Financial dependence (EFD) measures the extent to which firms depend on external finance and is calculated at the three-digit ISIC level using U.S. companies data over the 1970s following the method in Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Liquidity needs is defined as the ratio of inventories to total sales calculated at the three-digit ISIC level using U.S. companies data over the 1970s following Raddatz (2006 Private bureau coverage The number of individuals and firms listed in a credit bureau's database as of January 1, 2014, with information on their borrowing history within the past five years, plus the number of individuals and firms that have had no borrowing history in the past five years but for which a lender requested a credit report from the bureau in the period between January 2, 2013, and January 1, 2014. The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult population (the population age 15 and above in 2013 according to the World Bank's World Development Indicators). A credit bureau is defined as a private firm or nonprofit organization that maintains a database on the creditworthiness of borrowers (individuals or firms) in the financial system and facilitates the exchange of credit information among creditors. If no credit bureau operates, the coverage value is 0.0%. Public registry coverage
The number of individuals and firms listed in a credit registry's database as of January 1, 2014, with information on their borrowing history within the past five years, plus the number of individuals and firms that have had no borrowing history in the past five years but for which a lender requested a credit report from the registry in the period between January 2, 2013, and January 1, 2014. The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult population (the population age 15 and above in 2013 according to the World Bank's World Development Indicators). A credit registry is defined as a database that is managed by the public sector, usually by the central bank or the superintendent of banks, and that collects information on the creditworthiness of borrowers (individuals or firms) in the financial system and facilitates the exchange of credit information among banks and other regulated financial institutions. If no credit registry operates, the coverage value is 0.0%.
Legal rights of creditors and debtors
Measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders to expand access to credit. The index includes several key components in the Creditor rights index in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) , such as secured creditors are paid first (before other creditors such as government and employees) when a business is liquidated; or secured creditors are not subject to an automatic stay or moratorium on enforcement procedures when a debtor enters a courtsupervised reorganization procedure. Besides creditor rights, the index also captures several aspects of collateral laws that supposedly enhance the borrowers' access-tofinance ability: whether certain types of assets (i.e., movable assets) are legally accepted as collateral by financial institutions. The index of legal rights ranges from 0 to 10, with higher value indicating stronger legal rules that facilitate private credit extended from financial intermediaries to individuals and firms Doing Business, Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) Strength of insolvency framework index
The index comprises four components, namely commencement of proceedings, management of debtor's assets, reorganization proceedings and creditor participation. Commencement of proceedings describes the availability of liquidation and reorganization to debtors and creditors, as well as the standard used for commencement of insolvency proceedings. Management of debtor's assets includes whether the debtor can continue and reject contracts during insolvency, avoid preferential and undervalued transactions after proceedings are initiated, and the availability and seniority of postcommencement finance. Reorganization proceedings measure the extent to which creditors' approval and content are required to proceed with a reorganization plan. Creditor participation captures creditors' participation and legal rights in the course of insolvency proceedings, namely the selection of insolvency representatives, approval of the sale of substantial assets of the debtor, access financial information of the debtor, and objection to the court decision. The index of Strength of insolvency framework ranges from 0 to 18, with higher values suggesting greater effectiveness of a country's legal system in resolving insolvency. Gender An indicator that equals one if the respondent is female, and zero otherwise.
Age Natural logarithm of the respondent age.
Firm-level variables
Working capital financed from banks
The proportion of working capital in a firm that is financed from borrowed from banks. Enterprise Survey, the World Bank Investment financed from banks
The proportion of a firm's long-term investment (i.e., purchase of fixed assets) that is financed from borrowed from banks.
Trade payable
The proportion of the value of total annual purchases of material inputs or services that are paid for after delivery.
Trade receivable
The proportion of a firm's total sales of its goods or services that are paid for after delivery. Firm size Natural logarithm of total number of employees.
Firm age Natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm starts operation.
Profitability
The ratio of net profits to total sales.
Government ownership
An indicator that equals one if a firm has positive government ownership, and zero otherwise.
Foreign ownership
An indicator that equals one if a firm has positive government ownership, and zero otherwise. Exports A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a positive share of sales exported outside of the country, and zero otherwise.
Sales growth
The median value of firms' sales growth within an industry in each year.
Industry-level variables
External finance dependence The fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internally generated cash flows in the United States. We use U.S. data over the earliest available decade, the 1970s, to calculate EFD at the three-digit ISIC level.
Rajan and Zingales
Liquidity needs The proportion of inventories not financed by current sales, calculated at the three-digit ISIC level using U.S. data over the 1970s.
Raddatz (2006) 
